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Anarchism and Moral Philosophy 
Benjamin Franks 
Introduction 
Max Stirner argued that the essence of the individual is always more than its definition: 
“nothing that is designated as my essence exhausts me.”1 So, too, any statement about 
anarchism is not exhaustive, for it can always be met with counter-examples. The various 
accounts of anarchist moral philosophy are indicative of the limits and incompleteness of any 
single description. Nonetheless, different anarchist theorists and movements can, in part, be 
identified by their distinctive arrangement of meta-ethical beliefs and identification and 
prioritization of different ethical principles, and the ways in which they are applied.  
Because of this plurality and pervasiveness of ethical discourses, moral analysis has 
been identified as one of the core characteristics of anarchism, especially in contexts where it 
is distinguished from revolutionary movements, such as orthodox Marxism. As the 
philosopher Simon Critchley notes: “Anarchism has tended to be an ethical discourse about 
revolutionary practice.”2 The radical anthropologist David Graeber makes a similar 
observation: “Politically, what is most compelling about anarchism is its emphasis on ethics 
as a binding factor in political practice.”3 By contrast, orthodox Marxism is associated with 
                                                          
1
 Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own (London: Rebel Press, 1993), 366. 
2
 D. Graeber, “The Twilight of Vanguardism” (2003), 6, available online at http://theanarchistlibrary.org/ 
library/david-graeber-the-twilight-of-vanguardism.pdf, p.6. Note that this is a slightly different version of a 
paper with the same title by the same author in J. MacPhee and E. Reulan, eds., Realizing the Impossible 
(Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2007), 250-253. 
3
 S. Critchley, Infinitely Demanding (London: Verso, 2007), 93 
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broader economic analysis as part of a broader theory of revolutionary strategy.
4
 Graeber 
goes on to develop, nuance, and evaluate this apparent dichotomy, highlighting the 
intersections between heterodox Marxist interests in concrete, ethical practice and anarchist 
interest in high theory, a point borne out in, for instance, the works of autonomists like Harry 
Cleaver and the autonomist-influenced David Harvey.
5
 However, Graeber argues that 
anarchism is 
 …primarily an ethics of practice; and it insists, before anything else, that one’s means 
most be consonant with one’s ends; one cannot create freedom through authoritarian 
means; that as much as possible, one must embody the society one wishes to create.
6
 
Graeber’s description of anarchism is pertinent to this article for three reasons. First, he 
confirms the priority given to ethical evaluation within anarchism. Second, he ties this ethical 
analysis to material practices; and thirdly, he identifies a commitment to prefiguration—that 
the means have to be in accordance with the ends. These latter two points will be developed 
later to argue that anarchism is more properly understand as a sophisticated materialist ethical 
theory. So as well as providing a survey of ethical positions found within the main anarchist 
currents, this contribution will argue that it is more productive and consistent with the main 
features of anarchism to regard it as closer to the radical virtue theory of Alasdair MacIntyre 
and the revolutionary Aristotelian tradition, rather than, for instance, a rights-based ethical 
theory as some proponents and critics present it.
7
 
                                                          
4
 Graeber, “The Twilight of Vanguardism,” 6; Critchley, Infinitely Demanding, 146. See also J. Heckert and J. 
Biehl, quoted in M. Wilson, Rules Without Rulers: The Possibilities and Limits of Anarchism (Winchester, UK: 
Zero, 2014), 88-89. 
5
 See, for example, H. Cleaver, “Kropotkin, Self-valorization and the Crisis of Marxism,” Anarchist Studies 2:2 
(1994), 119-35, available online at http://la.utexas.edu/users/hcleaver/kropotkin.html; See also D. Harvey, The 
Promise of Revolutionary Humanism, Striker Pocket Pamphlet Series 3 (London: Strike, 2015). 
6
 Graeber, “The Twilight of Vanguardism,” 6-7. 
7
 G. Baldelli, Social Anarchism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), 79-114; D. Knowles, Political Philosophy 
(London: Routledge, 2001), 249-50; Wilson, Rules Without Rulers, 2-3, 94-95; R.P. Wolff, In Defense of 
Anarchism (New York: Harper, 1970); J. Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 
2006), 30, 46-7. 
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 Amongst the key theorists of the classical anarchist canon, William Godwin, Michael 
Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon all directly address 
the nature of anarchist ethics or have impacted on the development of (1) meta-ethics, (2) 
normative ethics, and (3) applied moral analysis.
8
 Similarly, moral terminology is a 
significant feature of contemporary anarchist activist discussion even if it is sometimes 
inconsistent or under-developed. Key concepts like “equality,” “freedom,” “solidarity,” and 
“justice” are pervasive features of anarchist discussions, being important enough to feature in 
the titles of activist groups.
9
 This account of the intersection between anarchism and moral 
philosophy is structured on these three sub-disciplines (meta-ethics, normative ethics and 
applied ethics) in order to identify and evaluate the distinctive, albeit overlapping variants of 
anarchism.  
Taking into account the chapter’s opening assertions—first, that the prevalence of 
moral discourse is a core characteristic of anarchism, and, second, that for any assertion about 
anarchism there are counter-examples—then it is unsurprising that there are anti-moralist 
currents within anarchism. It is appropriate then to begin with these amoralist and nihilist 
positions. 
 
Meta-ethics 
                                                          
8
 See for instance William Godwin, The Anarchist Writings of William Godwin (London: Freedom Press, 1986), 
64-87; Mikhail Bakunin, The Political Philosophy of Bakunin, ed. G.P. Maximoff (New York: Free Press, 
1953), 120-69; Peter Kropotkin, Ethics: Origins and Development (Montreal: Black Rose, 1992), especially 
268-279; Peter Kropotkin, Anarchist Morality (Edmonton: Black Cat, 2005); Emma Goldman, “The Victim of 
Morality” [1913], available online at http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/goldmanmor.htm; M. Hewitt, “Emma 
Goldman: The Case for Anarcho-Feminism,” in The Anarchist Papers, ed. D. Roussopoulos (Montreal: Black 
Rose, 1986), 170-71; Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, “Justice in Revolution and in the Church,” in Property is Theft! A 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon Anthology, ed. I. McKay (Oakland, CA: AK, 2011), 619-684;. A. Prichard, “The 
Ethical Foundations of Proudhon’s Republican Anarchism,” Anarchism and Moral Philosophy, ed. B. Franks 
and M. Wilson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 86-112. 
9
 For example, the Freedom Press Group, Climate Justice Committee, the British Libertarian Group (1961-92), 
Solidarity, etc. 
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Amoralism and nihilism are meta-ethical positions. The nihilist argues that moral values are 
undiscoverable,
10
 whilst the amoralist, by contrast, does not dispute that moral principles may 
exist and are discoverable but that they have no binding force. Interwoven with these 
traditions is a tendency to consider ethical principles and moral values as simply the product 
of dominating power wishing to silence or channel dissent.
11
 Goldman’s denunciation of 
“morality” is a good example, as she sees such discourses as a way for dominant powers to 
discipline women for their own ends.
12
 Other examples of amoralism can be found in the 
early egoist movement
13
 and more recently in the individualist insurrectionist current:  
With no sovereign systems of morality, theory, principles or social abstractions 
standing above the singular individual, the nihilist-anarchist attacks all systems, 
including identity and ideology systems, as obstacles to our self-realisation. The 
struggle is against not only the domination of controlling social organisation and 
widespread tranquilisation, but also against inherited repressive programming and the 
force of daily life, and so our struggle is a constant tension where what we must 
destroy and transcend is much more obvious than where we might end up.
14
 
The nihilist argument is right to criticize the position found in other anarchisms (as will be 
discussed below) that there are discoverable, universal moral principles, as there seems no 
indisputable method for ascertaining them. Such appeals to universal morality obscure the 
power relationships by which values are constructed and maintained. The problem is that 
nihilists and amoralists, despite their rejections of morality, still use moral arguments to 
defend their position, as when they attack the “dishonesty,” “wilful ignorance,” and 
                                                          
10
 J. Golomb, In Search of Authenticity: from Kierkegaard to Camus (London: Routledge, 1995), 173. 
11
 The impact of Friedrich Nietzsche’s deconstruction of normative ethics may be relevant here. See, for 
example, J. Purkis, “Anarchy Unbound: A Tribute to John Moore,” in John Moore and Spencer Sunshine, I Am 
Not a Man, I Am Dynamite, ed. J. Moore and S. Sunshine (New York: Autonomedia, 2004), 5-8: 5; and D. 
Colson, “Nietzsche and the Libertarian Workers’ Movement,” in ibid.,12-28.  
12
 Goldman, “The Victim of Morality.” 
13
 See, for example, D. Marsden “The Illusion of Anarchism,” The Egoist 1:23 (September 15, 1914).  
14
 DMP, “Beyond the Movement—Anarchy!,” in Anarchy Civil or Subversive (n.d.), 12-14, 12, available online 
at http://325.nostate.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/civil-anarchism-book.pdf. 
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“cowardice” of other anarchists who fail to actively and consistently resist oppression15 and 
support the “fraternity” and “courage” found in individualist insurrectionary movements.16 
Goldman, too, has an account of the fully flourishing person, capable of full-liberated social 
relations, as opposed to the “grey-grown victim of a grey-grown Morality.”17 If values really 
were unimportant then there is no reason to favor the honest, wise, liberated, and flourishing 
individual over the selfish, gutless, and bewildered. 
 Instead, the anarchist nihilist and amoralist tend to construct an ethical basis on the 
individual’s own moral feelings and individual conscience: “As an anarchist, I reject moral 
codes, but I have the measure of my principles to hold against my life.”18 This move from 
amoralism to subjectivism (associated with Stirner) has its own problems.
19
  
 Subjectivism has a number of attractive features. It avoids the ontological problems of 
a fixed set of universal principles, which undermines human freedom, and the 
epistemological problems of determining a methodology by which this universal set of values 
can be identified. The rejection of universal standards means that individuals are free to 
create their own goals. It avoids the recreation of hierarchies of power upon which 
universalisms rest (as discussed below). However, there are substantial problems with such 
subjectivism. 
 Amongst the most serious flaws in the belief that the individual (or individual 
consciousness) constitutes the basis for morality are: (1) it denies the possibility of moral 
disagreement and thus the potential to transform ethical principles and practice; (2) it can be 
used to justify all manner of actions which are inconsistent even with the proposed position 
                                                          
15
 Ibid. See also Anarchist-nihilists, “Against the British ‘Anti-capitalist Movement’: Brief Notes on Their 
Ongoing Failure,” in Anarchy Civil or Subversive, 18-24: 20, 23; Anarchist-nihilists Against the Activist 
Establishment “Fuck Indymedia and the Anarcho-Left,” in Anarchy Civil or Subversive, 52-53. 
16
 Anarchist-nihilists, “Against the British ‘Anti-capitalist Movement,’” 24; DMP, “Introduction,” in Anarchy 
Civil or Subversive, 3-7: 6. 
17
 Goldman, “The Victim of Morality.” 
18
 L., “Fragment: Illegality,” in Anarchy Civil or Subversive, 37-38: 37. 
19
 Whether this subjectivism is consistent with Stirner’s Egoism is a matter of debate. At first glance it seems 
consistent with his fluid, but self-prioritizing, unique subject. The individual egoist, according to Stirner, is the 
ultimate arbiter of value: “If it is right for me, it is right” (Stirner, Ego and Its Own, 191). 
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of individualist insurrectionists, including the promotion of hierarchies; (3) it ignores the 
material, social conditions that form a necessary (but not complete) part of ethical discourses; 
and thus (4) it has an incomplete account of agency. 
If the individual is the single, ultimate arbiter of moral knowledge then there is no 
basis to challenge a moral statement. A moral dispute becomes simply a disagreement 
between two rival consciences, one approving of the action and the other disapproving.
20
 
There are no external grounds for resolving disagreements or for revising and transforming 
current principles or changing behaviors. Thus, for a subjectivist, any disagreement between 
an anarchist committed to contesting hierarchies of oppression and a statist approving of 
discrimination and racial hierarchies is reduced to a matter of preferences. A subjectivist can 
argue that whilst you may find cowardice, dishonesty and ignorance inferior to bravery, 
integrity, and solidarity, that is merely a matter of opinion. So a rejection of murder, child 
abuse, or wanton environmental destruction becomes reduced to personal preference, with the 
most powerful will taking precedence. 
Similarly, the appeal to conscience fails to recognize that individual preferences and 
cognitive structures for decision-making and articulation of those choices are partly the 
product of (as well as partly constituting) material social practices. The types of 
differentiation, the forms of analysis and what is raised as a problem worthy of consideration, 
take place because of absences, contradictions, and/or conflicts in material practices. These 
are not just the product of an individual conscience (as standard idealists would argue), but 
the interplay of different consciousnesses (inter-subjectivity), their labor, and other material 
resources (dead labor). This account is in agreement with John P. Clark’s anarchist reading of 
Hegel, who argues that transformation occurs by recognizing the conflicts caused by material 
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 H. Gensler, Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), 24-25. 
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limits and seeking ways of going beyond them.
21
 Transcendence from existing practices and 
values is a necessary feature of a radical moral theory which aims to promote substantive 
economic and social change.  
By failing to link moral decisions to the concrete practices in which judgements arise, 
subjectivists fail to recognize how ethical subject identities are partly constituted by their 
engagement in these activities. Instead of an abstract consciousness or “empty field,” moral 
actors acknowledge that they have particular, but alterable (and negatable) social roles in 
different social contexts. The duties of a physician, for instance, are different from those of a 
member of a citizen’s militia.  
Whilst Stirner is conventionally regarded as a subjectivist, Saul Newman suggests a 
potentially fruitful (but also potentially anachronistic) post-structuralist reading of Stirner in 
which the Stirnerite ego is a “singularity”22 or “swirl of singularities.”23 These singularities 
have no essential positive characteristics, but are formed in the interactions between different 
practices and are open to radical transformation through self-activity. Although Newman’s 
Stirner is much more materialist than his standard critics would suggest,
24
 his account does 
not altogether escape the accusation of promoting hierarchies as it is still the singularities that 
constitute Stirner (and other self-identifying egoists) that take priority.
25
  
The inclusion of Stirner in the canon of anarchist thinkers is largely based on the 
German jurist Paul Elzbacher’s initial construction26 and is partly responsible for anarchism 
                                                          
21
 J.P. Clark, The Impossible Community: Realizing Communitarian Anarchism (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 
64-65. 
22
 S. Newman, quoted  in D. Rousselle, “Postanarchism and its Critics: A Conversation with Saul Newman,” 
Anarchist Studies 21.2 (2013), 74-96: 80. 
23
 Ibid., 81. 
24
 See, for instance, K. Marx, The German Ideology (Moscow: Progress, 1976), 130ff; for an alternative 
anarchist-communist reading of Stirner see I. McKay, An Anarchist FAQ, volume 2 (Edinburgh: AK Press, 
2012), 646-48.  
25
 “Egoism does not think of sacrificing anything, giving away anything that it wants; it simply decides, what I 
want I must have and will procure” (Stirner, Ego and its Own, 257).  
26
 R. Kinna, Anarchism: A Beginner’s Guide (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005), 10-11, although Plekhanov included 
Stirner—alongside Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, and various “smaller fry,” such as Grave and Reclus—five 
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being associated with and dismissed as idealism, a criticism most commonly associated with 
orthodox Marxism.
27
 Yet Stirner’s inclusion is highly contested. Michael Schmidt and Lucien 
van der Walt argue that the abstract individualist and idealist features of Stirner’s work (a 
representation that Newman contests) make Stirner’s egoism incompatible with the broadly 
social orientation of anarchism.
28
 Kropotkin, too, in his incomplete final work, ends with a 
criticism of Striner’s inadequate moral theory (which he describes as “anti-morality”). 
Kropotkin argues that Stirner ignores the biological, social, and psychological resources in 
which agents build their identities and mutually beneficial social practices.
29
 
Kropotkin, Bakunin, and contemporary advocates like Schmidt and van der Walt 
contend that anarchism is a materialist theory. However, the materialism to which anarchism 
adheres is not synonymous with the strict determinism of historical materialism. Orthodox 
Marxists and other economic determinists argue that moral principles are irrelevant to social 
change, as real transformation occurs as a result of technological changes in the economic 
base which follow predetermined laws of development.
30
 Anthony Skillen points to instances 
of Marx’s texts in which he appears to reject moral analysis, seeing ethical discourse as 
simply a phenomenon of bourgeois control of the means of production.
31
 Similar lines of 
thought can be found in some forms of social anarchism. Class War’s Adrienne Lintzgy, for 
instance, argues that the legal institutions predicated on notions of rights, as well as the entire 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
years before Eltzbacher. See Anarchism and Socialism (Minneapolis: New Times Socialist Publishing, 1895), 
available online at http://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1895/anarch/index.htm. 
27
 See Plekhanvov, Anarchism and Socialism; Joseph Stalin, Anarchism Or Socialism?, available online at  
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1906/12/x01.htm. 
28
 M. Schmidt and L. van der Walt, Black Flame: The Revolutionary Class Politics of Anarchism and 
Syndicalism (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2009), 64-5. 
29
 Kropotkin, Ethics, 338. 
30
 See, for example, K. Marx A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1970), 20-22.  
31
 A. Skillen, “Workers Interests and the Proletarian Ethic: Conflicting Strains in Marxian Anti-moralism,” 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 7 (1981), 155-70: 55-56. 
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conceptual apparatus of rights itself, are simply tools to maintain the bourgeois order and to 
obscure the reality of class domination.
32
  
However, even here alternatives and contradictions can be found. Lintzgy, for 
instance, ends his injunction against liberal conceptions of rights with a call for “class 
justice.” What is often at stake is a confusion over repeated rejections of “moralism” for a 
rejection of moral analysis. The term “moralism” appears to be used in a wide variety of 
senses. Sometimes it refers to the deliberate construction of principles to defend hierarchical 
practices,
33
 sometimes to the application of potentially radical moral principle (but in an 
unconsciously inconsistent way in order to serve the interests of the powerful
34
); and 
sometimes to the general application of apparently universal and neutral principles without 
recourse to the social contexts in which they arise and are applied.
35
 As will be discussed, a 
consistent moral analysis includes identifying the material conditions which form, and are 
formed by, social relationships, shared practices, and their discourses. One of the criticisms 
made of academic ethics, within which this contribution rests, is that it often ignores the 
particular material conditions of its own construction and therefore is blind to its own biases 
and lacunae.
36
 
The main Enlightenment positions on meta-ethics have been universalist theories. 
They share a number of characteristics, namely: (1) that there are objectively identifiable 
universal moral principles; (2) that these are not partial to any particular class or the ideal 
product of the superior dominant class; (3) that they can be applied objectively, even if, in 
                                                          
32
 A. Lintzgy, “Human Rights or Class Justice,” The Heavy Stuff 1 (n.d.), 4. 
33
 Goldman, “The Victim of Morality.” 
34
 Harvey The Promise of Revolutionary Humanism, column 1. 
35
 See, for example, R. de Witt, “An Anarchist Response to Seattle: What Shall We Do With Anarchism?,” 
Perspectives on Anarchist Theory 4:1 (2000), available online at http://flag.blackened.net/ias/7seattle.htm; 
Workers Solidarity Movement, “Book Review - Anarchy’s Cossack: Nestor Makhno,” Black and Red 
Revolution 10 (2005), 17-19: 19. 
36
 See, for example, M. Le Doeuff, “Long Hair, Short Ideas,” The Philosophical Imaginary (London: Athlone, 
1989), 100-27. 
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practice, they are used in a distorted ways; and (4) that misapplications or misidentifications 
of moral principles can be identified through the use of some rational procedure.
37
  
The main examples of Enlightenment, universalist ethics are realism (largely 
deontological) and naturalism (primarily utilitarian consequentialist). Despite, their 
significant differences, they are both committed to a dispassionate, systematic basis for 
identifying and justifying ethical principles. In the case of naturalist ethics, like John Stuart 
Mill’s utilitarianism, empirical study demonstrates the veracity of utilitarian principles. For 
deontologists, like Immanuel Kant, pure Reason is the only sure way of discovering universal 
ethical principles. An exception to moral naturalism and realism is intuitionistic ethics, which 
regards moral truths as being inherently hardwired into the human subject: they are either 
self-evident or else identified through a separate moral sense, irreducible to reason or 
evidence. Intuitionists have a number of problems: first, explaining why there are moral 
disagreements if there is a common ethical sense; and second, accounting for the fact that the 
epistemological basis for an unknowable moral instinct takes moral analysis outside of 
critical discourse and reduces it to theology.
38
 
Critics of “moralism” are right to be skeptical of the claims to universal value found 
in the Enlightenment ethics of realism and naturalism. Such universalism is ontologically and 
ethically suspect as humans would no longer have the freedom to develop their own values. 
In addition, it is highly unlikely that there are grounds for discovering universal knowledge 
which can be applied impartially in societies divided by class (as well as race, ethnicity, 
religion, etc.).
39
 The assumption that there is a single universal reason or scientific method for 
the identification of values implicit to specific forms of social practice is also highly 
disputable.  
                                                          
37
 D. D. Raphael, Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 18-22; P. McLaughlin, Anarchism and 
Authority: A philosophical introduction to classical anarchism (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 40.  
38
 Bakunin seems to be anticipating this criticism of intuitionism See The Political Philosophy of Bakunin, 150-
51. 
39
 Mikhail Bakunin, God and the State (New York: Dover, 1970), 33, 35, 66-67. 
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However, this is not to reject ethics, or base it on contentious subjectivist grounds. A 
materially grounded ethics is possible and consistent with anarchism. Here values are 
generated by, and specific to, the stable social practices or traditions that form them, although 
there will be overlaps and continuities with similar and adjacent social practices. Humans are 
creatures that have some (albeit changing) biological and psychological needs which can be 
met in a variety of ways, and critical imaginations which are able to empathize and conceive 
of alternatives. To meet ever-changing needs and desires humans develop productive 
practices.
40
 Many of these practices have internally generated rules which are necessary for 
their operation, though these are not coercively imposed or indisputable. Indeed, practitioners 
may adapt and change them. So, for instance, the social goods associated with communal 
cooking and feasting require materials (equipment, power source, and ingredients) and 
human labor. Anarchists argue that organizing practices in as anti-hierarchical manner as 
possible will generate the greatest inherent goods and produce sustainable external benefits.
41
 
Some critics have argued that having an explicit and identifiable meta-ethics would be 
too restrictive.
42
 However, the critical materialism identifiable in many anarchist approaches 
sees values as a necessary, and indeed unavoidable, part of any social practice, although it 
does not identify any single value as dominant or universal. This non-universalist approach 
still provides grounds for shared, albeit incomplete and non-universal, criteria by which 
moral discussion and evaluation can take place.  
It is not necessary to have a fully developed meta-ethics to have practical normative 
or situated ethical guidelines (however provisional and open). Many activists and critical 
practitioners do not, for good reason, focus on meta-ethical debates, concentrating instead on 
practical solutions to pressing social problems. So although the meta-ethical status associated 
                                                          
40
 See, for example, Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid (London: Penguin, 1939), 180.  
41
 See, for example, C. Ward, Anarchy in Action (London: Freedom, 1982); Peter Kropotkin, Fields, Factories 
and Workshops (Montreal: Black Rose, 1993), 180-81; Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, 180, 216-17. 
42
 S. Newman, The Politics of Postanarchism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 50-51; Newman 
quoted in Rouselle, “Postanarchism and Its Critics,” 82. 
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with normative positions can be questionable, the reasons for advancing these principles are 
usually based on more pragmatic and political goals than on philosophical consistency.  
 
Normative and Situated Ethics 
There are two main normative traditions. The first, consequentialism, involves assessing 
actions on the basis of how effectively they achieve a pre-given goal. The main 
consequentialist theory is largely utilitarian (“acts are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness”43). The second 
main normative theory is deontology (rights-based ethics) which, in its classical Kantian 
form, is based on the rational subject’s freedom to make logical decisions concerning his or 
her own destiny. Such rational, autonomous decisions may well not produce individual or 
collective happiness. 
Both deontology and consequentialism capture important features of anarchism. The 
first emphasizes individual freedom (and the necessary principle of minimizing coercion) and 
the second a concern with social well-being. However, whether taken individually or together 
(if it were possible to fully synthesize them) they are not sufficient. Consequentialism can be 
found in the works of thinkers as diverse as William Godwin, Johann Most, Bakunin, and 
Sergei Nechaev. Godwin, like the later Mill, prioritizes the promotion of higher pleasures in 
their various forms.
44
 Both emphasize the protection of rights, although these are based on the 
hypothetical ground that they are the best guarantor of achieving socially desirable goals.
45
 
This suggests that rights may be violated where there is significant social benefit. Like Mill, 
Godwin’s utilitarianism sometimes merges into a form of virtue theory,46 as it stresses the 
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 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),55. 
44
 William Godwin, “Summary of Principles,” in The Anarchist Writings of William Godwin, 49-50. 
45
 Ibid., 50-52. 
46
 See Mill’s discussions of higher pleasures and of the role of justice in Utilitarianism, 57-58 and 105-06 
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development of a rounded and socially-located individual, rather than just a pleasure-seeking 
one. Most, by contrast, is more straightforwardly consequentialist: 
Ethics? The end of revolution is freedom; the end justifies the means. The struggle for 
freedom is a war; wars are to be won and therefore to be waged with all energy, 
ruthlessly [ ... ] using all there is to be used, including the latest in technology and the 
first of chemistry, to kill oppressors forthwith.... 
47
 
Similarly Nechaev proposes a strict consequentialism: 
 
The revolutionary is a dedicated man (sic). He has no interests of his own, no affairs, 
no feelings, no attachments, no belongings, not even a name. Everything in him is 
absorbed by a single passion – the revolution. 
[…] He knows only one science, the science of destruction. To this end, and this end 
alone, he will study mechanics, physics, chemistry and medicine. […] His sole and 
constant object is the immediate destruction of this vile order.
48
 
Despite important differences between Nechaev and Bakunin,
49
 Nechaev’s influence can be 
found in the latter’s call for a strategic anarchism based on a unified, disciplined body able to 
create the singular event of a revolution.
50
 However, strict consequentialism is criticized on 
many grounds, including by Bakunin. First, there is ontological doubt as to whether a single, 
universal goal exists and, if it does, whether it is discoverable. Secondly, such strict 
consequentialism can impact severely on the autonomy of the individual, reducing human 
subjects to mere instruments in the satisfaction of the grand plan. Third, as the quotation from 
Nechaev indicates, consequentialism damages the character of the individual: such 
instrumentalism reduces moral subjects to little more than coldly calculating machines. The 
                                                          
47
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consequentialist calculation is similar in form to capitalist exchange. It assesses (anti-) 
political tactics on the basis of whether resources invested in them are going to reap a suitable 
return over and against alternative actions. It is for these reasons that Nechaev’s 
consequentialism is considered antithetical to the main forms of anarchism.
51
  
Deontological ethics is the one most associated with the term “anarchism” in political 
and moral philosophy.
52
 Philosophers such as Richard Dagger and Dudley Knowles have 
constructed “academically respectable” versions of anarchism based on deontological 
principles which are then contrasted with the supposedly irrationally violent social 
movement.
53
 This narrow iteration of anarchism (known as “philosophical anarchism”) holds 
a significant position in moral and political philosophy, being close to Nozickian liberalism.
54
 
It is based on one supreme principle: the autonomy of the rational individual. This requires an 
absolute avoidance of coercion and total respect for negative rights. Some have modified this 
largely right-libertarian (or “propertarian”) account of anarchism to also include principles of 
equality.
55
 
There are a number of problems with deontological accounts of anarchism. Even 
advocates accept that it is hard to conceive of societies where coercion is entirely absent.
56
 
Without an agreed external authority, as Jonathan Wolff notes, the philosophical anarchist 
relies solely on private judgement.
57
 This leads to the problems previously noted regarding 
subjectivism, wherein there is no way of resolving disputes when the ultimate arbiter is 
individual conscience. The problem of conflicting judgements is resolved, at least initially, by 
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claiming that anarchists hold a metaphysical belief in a benign human instinct. Without the 
distorting influence of malign state practice individuals would agree to the most cooperative 
solution.  
Appeals to humanism or, indeed, any sort of essentialism, are inherently weak and 
open to all sorts of criticisms. One is epistemological: by what means can one derive a core, 
universal characteristic common to all humanity? Others are practical. If humans are 
essentially benign, as Wolff argues, then why do oppressive institutions like the state develop 
in the first place?
58
 In light of these and other criticisms, the defense of anarchism fails and 
the theory can be easily refuted. Anarchists themselves understandably reject explanations 
such as Wolff’s. Instead, they recognize that humans have many conflicting instinctual 
drives
59
 and that anarchism, whilst not necessarily incompatible with nature, is not naturally 
ordained.
60
  
More standardly, deontological theories are viewed as inadequate by anarchists 
because they: (1) support and enhance inequalities; (2) have an inadequate account of 
freedom; (3) require hierarchical social institutions (whether a public or private enforcement 
agency); and (4) are based on a flawed account of human agency which corrupts social 
relationships. 
Whilst anarchism is critical of hierarchies of economic, social, and political power, 
classical rights-based theorists consider economic inequalities to be desirable, since they 
provide provide incentives to greater productive endeavor,
61
 either else of no concern 
provided they are the result of just exchange
62
 Contractual arrangements tend to exacerbate 
pre-existing inequalities, which further undermines the social standing of the weaker and 
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lessens their economic power and the representation of their interests within a market 
economy. Such inequalities can lead to slave-like circumstances in which the economically 
vulnerable have no choice but to comply with the demands of a monopolistic employer.
63
 
Classical deontology argues that respect for rights allows parties to make consensual, 
mutually beneficial agreements. Such arrangements are the ideal form of freedom: “There is 
in the operation of the market no compulsion and coercion.”64 However, socialist critics point 
out that those in economically subservient relationships have no choice but to sell their labor 
to survive.
65
 It is for this reason that the anarchist anthropologist David Graeber revives the 
notion of “wage-slavery.”66 
Deontological principles rest upon institutions for their enforcement and as such are 
antithetical to the anarchist rejection of hierarchical social structures. Liberal contracts are a 
social relationship between mutually competitive individuals primarily seeking their own 
individualized benefit regardless of the deleterious impact on either the other party to the 
contract or external groups. As such they differ from the “free agreements” favored by 
Kropotkin, which involve finding areas of enterprise that are mutually beneficial and thus 
require no enforcement.
67
 Liberal contracts, by contrast, are based on agents seeking personal 
advantage and so require an apparatus of enforcement. For this reason, as social institutions 
have been increasingly structured on classical liberal norms, the state has not withdrawn, as 
proponents had argued, but become more significant because it is necessary in order to police 
such contracts.
68
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The underlying moral agent presumed in deontological theory is the abstract 
individual who is the sole owner of her body (as property) and private property. This is a 
flawed account of human agency. First, it is another essentialism and thus prone to the 
problems of a universal account of the individual as discussed above. Second, as Graham 
Baugh points out in reference to Bakunin’s critique of liberalism, the account of agency is 
insufficient.
69
 Lockean, Kantian, and Rousseauian individualisms are based on moral subjects 
abstracted from the social setting—that is agents, who have no shared concepts or language 
by which to enter into meaningful social practices or contracts. Such agents would be 
stranded in a “nihilistic desert.”70 Thirdly, important social practices are damaged by being 
based on deontological norms. Reducing all relationships to transactional ones, as MacIntyre 
and Michael Sandel have argued, undermines solidarity and other important social virtues.
71
 
This position is shared by Bakunin and contemporary social anarchists, who also point to the 
“corrosive” impacts of individualism on practices based on cooperation, compassion, and 
camaraderie.
72
 
 Despite being portrayed as a theory that supremely privileges individual rights, 
anarchism’s commitment to prefiguration results in a rejection of deontology, which 
privileges means over ends, as well as of consequentialism, which prioritizes ends over 
means. Prefigurative methods do not reject the importance of good outcomes but neither do 
they make methods solely instrumental to their achievement. Instead, prefiguration 
encourages tactics that embody, as far as possible, the values inherent in the goals. Ends are 
not fixed, but they are inherent in material, social practices. 
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Perfectionism and virtue theory, like prefiguration, recognize that social relationships 
contain internal goods as well generating external goods. For perfectionists these non-moral 
goods, like health, are also required for a flourishing individual and society,
73
 whilst virtue 
theorists consider these non-moral goods to be resources for the generation and maintenance 
of virtues. Virtues are inter-personal attributes that are desirable in themselves and preferable 
to their opposites (so bravery is preferred over cowardice or rashness, generosity is favored 
over miserliness or being a spendthrift, etc.) but by developing and practicing relationships 
that embody these values they encourage the (re)production of other desirable social 
relationships. The generation of virtues is likely to produce a flourishing individual and 
society. For radical virtue theory, the contestation of hierarchies is a vital feature of virtues 
(bravery, for instance involves standing up to a bully and not encouraging modes of 
domination, wisdom involves sharing rather than monopolizing knowledge, etc.). Anti-
hierarchical relationships are a goal, and these forms of social relationship should be 
embodied in organizations and methods.
74
 
 Virtue theory has the advantage of  including many of the key concerns of deontology 
and utilitarianism, but sees them as moderating, and being moderated by, other values, such 
as solidarity, liberality, and compassion, which embody anarchist anti-hierarchical 
commitments. Deontological principles of respecting the freedoms of others and fulfilling 
one’s duties are consistent with virtues like integrity and justice, whilst utilitarian concern for 
the well-being of others is captured in virtues like compassion and generosity. The virtues act 
in unity. If someone is acting without wisdom or compassion, she is not demonstrating 
genuine bravery but rashness.  
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Whilst some virtue theorists are individualists, concentrating on individual self-
improvement, other virtue theorists like the renegade MacIntyre and his “revolutionary 
Aristotelian” followers75 prioritize the social, inter-personal character of the virtues. Virtues 
require social practices, which in turn are rule-governed activities that require resources and 
which produces shared goods, both internal and external. These rules are necessary for the 
practice to function, but do not necessarily require a centralized or fixed, hierarchical system 
of reward and punishment in order to operate. The principles that underpin that practice will 
change over time, though some may remain wholly stable. For instance, a competitive 
association football (or soccer) match requires materials such as pitch, goals, balls, and human labor 
(team-mates, competitors). It has shared discourses (“attack,” “formation”), rules (governing foul play 
and legitimate sanctions), identities (“team-mates,” “opponents,” “spectators”), and its own internal 
goods (such as camaraderie, physical bravery and athleticism). Practices develop over time into 
traditions, and different attributes are prioritized in different locations: in Scottish football, for 
example, hard tackling is considered a core attribute, while in Catalan football ball control is 
privileged over aggressive play. However, the main norms remain central to both, as do many of the 
internal goods and the key concepts. There are shared characteristics which make the game 
comprehensible to practitioners from different cultures, though it would be incomprehensible to 
someone from the same culture who only knew only ice-hockey or American football.  
At the same time, virtue-rich social practices can become corrupted. MacIntyre, consistent 
with anarchist critiques of capitalism, explains how virtuous social activities become undermined. 
First is when entrants into a practice become more concerned with achieving external goods rather 
than maintaining the activity’s internal goods: for example, when people only play football in order to 
gain the prize money that comes from winning the game. Here the practitioner may cheat or use other 
forms of gamesmanship (such as abusing opponents) to try to gain an unfair advantage, which 
undermines the game’s internal goods, discourages future participants, and fosters instrumental 
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interactions.
76
 When external goods are prioritized, the internal goods of a productive practice are 
necessarily marginalized. Kropotkin, for example, points to the ways in which the drive for efficient 
production undermines important social and aesthetic values and creates great harms.
77
  
Social practices become corrupted when inappropriate goods are imposed onto a practice, or 
when external goods are given supreme priority over internal goods, or a single value (usually 
exchange value) takes absolute precedence over all other values. Managerialism and neo-liberalism 
are associated with just corruption. Because different practices have different constellations of virtues, 
distinctive rules, and discourses, practitioners (and those in adjacent disciplines) are usually best 
positioned to understand how to conduct a practice. Bakunin, in his famous discussion on what 
constitutes just authority, explains that while there is legitimate authority of knowledge, both practical 
and theoretical, no one could have total knowledge. The authority of knowledge is limited and 
contextual: “Therefore there is no fixed and constant authority, but a continual exchange of mutual, 
temporary, and, above all, voluntary authority and subordination.”78 Where there is management 
external to the practice, autonomy is reduced and the virtues are undermined; where practitioners 
remain in control of their activity, virtues continue to flourish.  
Continual exposure to corrupt practices degrades those who undertake them. This leads to a 
problem identified by the heterodox Marxist David Harvey: if dehumanizing, hierarchical behaviors 
are pervasive, how is it possible to rediscover humane ways of living?
79
 Harvey’s answer is that one 
must confront vicious practices. Anarchists like Bookchin and the Trapese Collective agree, but they 
also stress than in contesting these practices the modes of opposition used by the oppressed must 
embody, as far as possible, the humane social relations they wish to see realized in a liberated 
society.
80
  
Whilst a radical virtue theory is, I argue, the form of ethics most consistent with 
anarchism’s commitment to anti-hierarchical, prefigurative social relationships to generate 
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mutual social goods, this is not to say that it is overtly recognized as such by anarchists 
themselves even though there is a pervasive use of virtue terminology in the evaluation of 
their own tactics as well as the political strategies of their opponents. Even within the pages 
of 325 Magazine, which purportedly targets “civil anarchism” and promotes “amoralism,” the 
failings of its opponents are analyzed in terms of cowardice, exclusionary elitism and lack of 
solidarity, and integrity:
81
 values which are social and practice-dependent. Social anarchists 
also use a wide variety of concepts drawn from virtue theory: When they discuss the joys of 
urban insurrection, Class War also highlight how the rediscovery of the power of the 
oppressed can be used to foster solidarity, anti-hierarchy and “new ways of relating to one 
another.”82 Likewise Malatesta stresses that the appropriate anarchist agent is one that is 
passionate about the welfare of others as well as himself, but such passion must also be 
tempered by wisdom. Inappropriate anarchist acts—and here Malatesta is referring to certain 
spectacular incidents of propaganda by deed—lack self-discipline and care even when they 
are by right principle.
83
 
In some arenas, because of particularly extensive and powerful forms of domination, 
all social practices are at risk of being corrupted. It is not surprising in these circumstances if 
activists are more concerned with resisting this form of oppression. Thus, there can be 
locations in which the concentration is on one particular form of resistance, which is 
accompanied by a singular ethical discourse. In the late 1940s and 1950s, with the 
intensification of the Cold War, some anarchists prioritized discourses based on “individual 
freedom” since it seemed as though social practices which included respect for individual 
sovereignty were most under threat by Soviet Marxism, on one hand, and the statist, 
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militarized democracies, on the other. The problem is that if a particular value (and 
corresponding single moral agent) is taken as universal, then this undermines other values 
and damages social practices based on these plural goods. 
A range of ethical theories (normative and meta-ethical) can be found within 
anarchism. However, it is the revolutionary Aristotelian tradition of virtue theory that appears 
to be most consistent with the main analyses and practices of anarchism. Radical virtue 
theory starts with a materialist interest in social practices which generate internal and external 
goods, and thus prefigure wider benevolent social practices. Virtues, because they work in 
unity, are antipathetic to hierarchy, as social relationships based on domination generate vices 
such as callousness, brutality, and injustice. Virtues are multiple; they are not reducible to a 
single, supreme value. To this extent virtue theory, like anarchism, is critical of capitalism, 
which prioritizes a single (exchange) value. 
The existence and persistence of a range of ethical stances within anarchism has a 
number of positive features. It encourages internal critique of existing practices and promotes 
dialogue amongst activists. Deontological anarchists will remind others of their shared 
commitments to liberty, whilst utilitarian interventions restrain socially negligent behavior. 
The shared interest in ethics, even from rival traditions, nevertheless demonstrates a mutual 
concern with the interests of others, even if there is disagreement on who “the others” are, as 
well as with which interests take priority. The language of moral discussion nevertheless 
provides one method (amongst others) for fruitful engagement and collaboration. Amoralist 
interventions, despite their weaknesses, nevertheless encourage reflection on the emergence 
of evaluative principles and the recognition that ethical discourse is not the sole language for 
collective action.  
 
Applied Ethics 
23 
 
There are a number of major areas where anarchist ethical principles have been a significant 
(albeit minor) current in professional debates. Anarchist influence on pedagogy, for example, 
has been well-documented,
84
 and anarchist interest in the micro-dynamics of political 
organization has been subject to systematic analysis, both historically and with the rise of 
social movements like Occupy.
85
 Whilst Occupy is diverse and many of its manifestations 
were not explicitly anarchist, these protest groups embodied many anarchist concerns with 
non-hierarchical social organization.
86
 Within explicitly anarchist organizations there have 
been debates around the use of tactics: those concerning violence and animal vivisection have 
had particularly significant exposure. More recently, such diverse private and public activities 
as business practices
87
 and gardening
88
 have been subject to anarchist analysis and 
intervention. Similarly, a long-running concern of anarchists—that of freedom of speech 
versus protection of minorities from abusive or apparently abusive speech-acts—remains 
contentious.  
There is insufficient space to deal adequately with any significant applied ethical 
dilemma. Instead, this section provides a general anarchist approach to applied ethical 
analysis and its critique of standard analytical methods. Much standard applied ethics 
involves clarifying and assessing regulations or norms promoted and/or enforced by state or 
quasi-state authorities, and the responsibilities of, and duties to, the individual.
89
A necessary 
feature of legislative guidance is that it provides an authoritative basis for decisions across all 
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social domains within a specific geographical region (referred to as “universal”). For 
universally applicable legislation, there has to be a singular definition, or formula for the 
generation of definitions, which can identify and interpret these norms, hence the analytic 
tradition’s concentration on conceptual clarification. 
Anarchist applied ethics, by contrast, argues that there is no single method of study or 
interpretation that can authoritatively and accurately identify, categorize, and evaluate all 
concepts outside of the social practices within which they arise. Universal definitions, 
anarchists argue, are almost certain to be defective and likely to damage diverse, irreducible 
social practices. Rather than concentrate on conceptual clarification, or emphasize the 
development of universal rules (such as those based on Lockean property rights) for dealing 
with social problems, the concentration shifts to a more micropolitical analysis of power and 
identity. An anarchist method explores specific activities from the perspective of the 
practitioners and those affected by the practice; it does not assume that there is an objective 
position from which to make a universally valid judgement. This method identifies the power 
relationships within and between those participating in or subject to the social activity and the 
connections and disjunctions between one practice and adjacent practices. It might also refer 
to the subject position of those making the judgements. This method identifies how affirming 
or reducing particular features of these rule-goverened activities (a shift of resources, a 
tweaking of the norms) might assist in the further generation of social goods. It would also 
explore how hierarchical impositions, whether state-, capital- or patriarchal-centered, can 
disrupt or corrupt social practices.  
Rather than a universalist, legislative approach, anarchists argue for one which is 
epistemologically and strategically more modest. Here, practitioners and participants identify 
the particular norms, resources, identities, and immanent goods (and harms) within particular 
traditions. Practitioners rather than legislators should take the lead in protecting their virtuous 
25 
 
practices from discriminatory and hierarchical interference. This does not necessarily rule out 
some manipulation and use of social power against coercive and abusive behavior, but in 
countering these threats, the methods used should also encapsulate the virtues, such as 
bravery, justice, compassion, and modesty. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided both an overview and an analysis of anarchist perspectives on 
meta-ethics, normative (and situated) ethics, and applied ethics. Distinctive meta-ethical and 
normative positions help shape, and are shaped by, the different constellations of anarchism. 
Thus egoist and certain post-anarchist formations support and are structured by subjectivist 
and nihilist positions, whilst some individualist anarchisms develop principles and practices 
consistent with liberal deontology. In addition to providing a survey, however, this 
contribution also argues for an account of anarchist ethics that is materialist, but not 
determinist or universalist, and which is consistent with revolutionary Aristotelianism. It 
recognizes that values are generated in material social practices. These values are vital to the 
continuation of these practices, but adapt over time. As social practices differ, different 
values take precedence, and indeed can be discovered or produced. Such a flexible, non-
universalist account is consistent with the prefigurative principles and non-universalist 
epistemologies that are core to anarchism.  
 
 
